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E22-437_Atay et al.pdf (561.21 KB)

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Working paper

Publication date

2022

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cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Atay et al., 2022
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/191605

School choice with farsighted students [WP]

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Abstract

We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism may not belong to any farsighted stable set. Hence, the TTC mechanism provides an assignment that is not only Pareto efficient but also farsightedly stable. Moreover, looking forward three steps ahead is already sufficient for stabilizing the matching obtained from the TTC.

Subject

Elecció d'escola, Presa de decisions (Estadística)

Subject (English)

School choice, Statistical decision

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UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]

Citation

ATAY, Ata, MAULEON, Ana and VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent. School choice with farsighted students [WP]. UB Economics – Working Papers. 2022. Vol.  E22/437. [consulted: 8 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/191605

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