School choice with farsighted students [WP]

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dc.contributor.authorAtay, Ata
dc.contributor.authorMauleon, Ana
dc.contributor.authorVannetelbosch, Vincent
dc.date.accessioned2022-12-15T11:16:10Z
dc.date.available2022-12-15T11:16:10Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.description.abstractWe consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism may not belong to any farsighted stable set. Hence, the TTC mechanism provides an assignment that is not only Pareto efficient but also farsightedly stable. Moreover, looking forward three steps ahead is already sufficient for stabilizing the matching obtained from the TTC.ca
dc.format.extent49 p.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/191605
dc.language.isoengca
dc.publisherUniversitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresaca
dc.relation.ispartofUB Economics – Working Papers, 2022, E22/437cat
dc.relation.ispartofseries[WP E-Eco22/437]ca
dc.rightscc-by-nc-nd, (c) Atay et al., 2022
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/*
dc.sourceUB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]
dc.subject.classificationElecció d'escolacat
dc.subject.classificationPresa de decisions (Estadística)cat
dc.subject.otherSchool choiceeng
dc.subject.otherStatistical decisioneng
dc.titleSchool choice with farsighted students [WP]ca
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperca

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