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Treball de fi de grau

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cc-by-nc-nd (c) Rubén Ureña Martínez, 2017
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/114878

An essay on assignment games

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This degree project studies the main results on the bilateral assignment game. This is a part of cooperative game theory and models a market with indivisibilities and money. There are two sides of the market, let us say buyers and sellers, or workers and firms, such that when we match two agents from different sides, a profit is made. We show some good properties of the core of these games, such as its non-emptiness and its lattice structure. There are two outstanding points: the buyers-optimal core allocation and the sellers-optimal core allocation, in which all agents of one sector get their best possible outcome. We also study a related non-cooperative mechanism, an auction, to implement the buyers-optimal core allocation.

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Treballs Finals de Grau de Matemàtiques, Facultat de Matemàtiques, Universitat de Barcelona, Any: 2017, Director: F. Javier Martínez de Albéniz

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Citació

UREÑA MARTÍNEZ, Rubén. An essay on assignment games. [consulta: 23 de gener de 2026]. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/114878]

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