Fitxers

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Article

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Versió acceptada

Data de publicació

2025-01-01

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cc-by-nc (c) The University of Chicago Press, 2025
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/231222

Courts’ Decisions, Cooperative Investments, and Incomplete Contracts

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Recurs relacionat

https://doi.org/10.1086/730424

Resum

Buyers may try to motivate their sellers to make relationship-specific investments to reduce the probability that the design of the goods they procure is defective. In some countries, courts examine how much real authority the seller had in performing the work in their assignment of liability for a design failure. I show that the approach followed by courts induces the sellers to underinvest and the buyers to underspecify the design of the goods. I explore efficiency-based justifications for this approach, such as the facilitation of optimal relational contracting and the provision of incentives to engage in noncontractible coordinating activities.

Matèries

Legalitat, Disseny industrial, Venedors, Inversions, Presa de decisions

Matèries (anglès)

Legality, Industrial design, Sales personnel, Investments, Decision making

Citació

Col·leccions

Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)

Citació

DE CHIARA, Alessandro. Courts’ Decisions, Cooperative Investments, and Incomplete Contracts. Journal of Legal Studies. 2025. Vol. 54, num. 1, pags. 117-164. ISSN 0047-2530. [consulted: 24 of September of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/231222

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