Carregant...
Fitxers
Tipus de document
ArticleVersió
Versió publicadaData de publicació
Tots els drets reservats
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/131242
Does electoral competition curb party favoritism?
Títol de la revista
Director/Tutor
ISSN de la revista
Títol del volum
Recurs relacionat
Resum
We study whether incumbents facing uncontested elections channel public spending towards co-partisan officials more than is the case of incumbents that are worried about reelection. We draw on data on capital transfers allocated by Spanish regions to local governments during 1995-2007. Using a regression discontinuity design, we document strong and robust effects. We find that a mayor belonging to the party of the regional president obtains twice the amount in grants received by an opposition's mayor. This effect is much greater for regional incumbents that won the previous election by a large margin, but it disappears for highly competitive elections.
Matèries (anglès)
Citació
Col·leccions
Citació
CURTO GRAU, Marta, SOLÉ OLLÉ, Albert, SORRIBAS, Pilar. Does electoral competition curb party favoritism?. _American Economic Journal: Applied Economics_. 2018. Vol. 10, núm. 4, pàgs. 378-407. [consulta: 23 de gener de 2026]. ISSN: 1945-7782. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/131242]