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IEB10-17_Borck+Wimbersky.pdf (680.4 KB)

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Working paper

Publication date

2010

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cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Borck et al., 2010
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116661

Political economics of higher education finance

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Abstract

We study voting over higher education finance in an economy with risk averse households who are heterogeneous in income. We compare four different systems and analyse voters' choices among them: a traditional subsidy scheme, a pure loan scheme, income contingent loans and graduate taxes. Using numerical simulations, we find that majorities for income contingent loans or graduate taxes become more likely as the income distribution gets more equal. We also perform sensitivity analyses with respect to risk aversion and the elasticity of substitution between high skilled and low skilled workers.

Subject

Eleccions, Educació superior, Finançament

Subject (English)

Elections, Higher education, Funding

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IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers

Citation

BORCK, Rainald and WIMBERSKY, Martin. Political economics of higher education finance. IEB Working Paper 2010/17. [consulted: 15 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116661

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