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IEB10-17_Borck+Wimbersky.pdf (680.4 KB)

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Document de treball

Data de publicació

2010

Llicència de publicació

cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Borck et al., 2010
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116661

Political economics of higher education finance

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Resum

We study voting over higher education finance in an economy with risk averse households who are heterogeneous in income. We compare four different systems and analyse voters' choices among them: a traditional subsidy scheme, a pure loan scheme, income contingent loans and graduate taxes. Using numerical simulations, we find that majorities for income contingent loans or graduate taxes become more likely as the income distribution gets more equal. We also perform sensitivity analyses with respect to risk aversion and the elasticity of substitution between high skilled and low skilled workers.

Matèries

Eleccions, Educació superior, Finançament

Matèries (anglès)

Elections, Higher education, Funding

Citació

Col·leccions

IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers

Citació

BORCK, Rainald and WIMBERSKY, Martin. Political economics of higher education finance. IEB Working Paper 2010/17. [consulted: 10 of July of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116661

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