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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116661
Political economics of higher education finance
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We study voting over higher education finance in an economy with risk averse households who are heterogeneous in income. We compare four different systems and analyse voters' choices among them: a traditional subsidy scheme, a pure loan scheme, income contingent loans and graduate taxes. Using numerical simulations, we find that majorities for income contingent loans or graduate taxes become more likely as the income distribution gets more equal. We also perform sensitivity analyses with respect to risk aversion and the elasticity of substitution between high skilled and low skilled workers.
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BORCK, Rainald, WIMBERSKY, Martin. Political economics of higher education finance. _IEB Working Paper 2010/17_. [consulta: 27 de gener de 2026]. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116661]