Political connections, corruption, and privatization of public services: Evidence from contracting out water services in Spain

dc.contributor.authorBel i Queralt, Germà, 1963-
dc.contributor.authorGonzález Gómez, Francisco
dc.contributor.authorPicazo Tadeo, Andrés José
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-15T15:26:00Z
dc.date.available2015-09-15T15:26:00Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.date.updated2015-09-15T15:26:00Z
dc.description.abstractPolitical corruption is a type of market failure. One area of public policy where corruption is relatively common is the contracting out of public services. Private firms can improve their chances of obtaining contracts by bribing politicians or public servants and funding political parties. In the same vein, firms can gain access to policy makers by hiring influential former politicians –a practice commonly referred to as revolving-doors. In Spain, a number of corruption cases, involving all the major political parties, are presently under judicial investigation. Some of these cases involve water contracts. Also, there is evidence showing that private firms have been funding political parties as well as hiring former politicians for top positions. In this paper, we use information from 892 privatizations of water services in Spanish municipalities between 1984 and 2014 and logistic multinomial regression techniques to study the association between specific firms securing contracts and the political parties ruling the municipalities. We find evidence of a systematic association between the Popular Party (Partido Popular or PP) and the firm, Aqualia, part of the large Spanish holding company, Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas (FCC), which is known to have funded the PP. Furthermore, former PP politicians have been appointed to top positions in the FCC board of directors.
dc.format.extent28 p.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.issn2014-1254
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/66894
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherUniversitat de Barcelona. Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública
dc.relation.isformatofReproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ub.edu/irea/working_papers/2015/201515.pdf
dc.relation.ispartofIREA – Working Papers, 2015, IR15/15
dc.relation.ispartofseries[WP E-IR15/15]
dc.rightscc-by-nc-nd, (c) Bel i Queralt et al., 2015
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
dc.sourceDocuments de treball (Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública (IREA))
dc.subject.classificationCorrupció política
dc.subject.classificationEleccions
dc.subject.classificationSociologia electoral
dc.subject.classificationDelictes polítics
dc.subject.classificationUrbanisme
dc.subject.classificationPolítica urbana
dc.subject.otherPolitical corruption
dc.subject.otherElections
dc.subject.otherVoting research
dc.subject.otherPolitical crimes
dc.subject.otherCity planning
dc.subject.otherUrban policy
dc.titlePolitical connections, corruption, and privatization of public services: Evidence from contracting out water services in Spain
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper

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