Carregant...
Tipus de document
Document de treballData de publicació
Llicència de publicació
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116760
How do local governments decide on public policy in fiscal federalism? Tax vs. expenditure optimization
Títol de la revista
Autors
Director/Tutor
ISSN de la revista
Títol del volum
Recurs relacionat
Resum
Previous literature widely assumes that taxes are optimized in local públic finance while expenditures adjust residually. This paper endogenizes the choice of the optimization variable. In particular, it analyzes how federal policy toward local governments influences the way local governments decide on public policy. Unlike the presumption, the paper shows that local governments may choose to optimize over expenditures. The result most notably prevails when federal policy subsidizes local taxation. The results offer a new perspective of the efficiency implications of federal policy toward local governments and, thereby, enable a more precise characterization of local government behaviour in fiscal federalism.
Matèries
Matèries (anglès)
Citació
Citació
KOETHENBUERGER, Marco. How do local governments decide on public policy in fiscal federalism? Tax vs. expenditure optimization. _IEB Working Paper 2010/29_. [consulta: 24 de gener de 2026]. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116760]