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IEB14-38_Ferraresi+Rizzo.pdf (1.69 MB)

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Document de treball

Data de publicació

2014

Llicència de publicació

cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Ferraresi et al., 2014
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/115584

Policy outcomes of single and double-ballot elections

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Resum

We use data for all Italian municipalities from 2001-2007 to empirically test the extent to which two different electoral rules, which hold for small and large municipalities, affect fiscal policy decisions at local level. Municipalities with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants elect their mayors in accordance with a single-ballot plurality rule where only one list can support her/him, while the rest of the municipalities uses a run-off plurality rule where multiple lists can support her/him. Per capita total taxes, charges and current expenditure in large municipalities are lower than in small ones.

Matèries

Eleccions locals, Relacions fiscals intergovernamentals, Impostos locals

Matèries (anglès)

Local elections, Intergovernmental fiscal relations, Local taxation

Citació

Col·leccions

IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers

Citació

FERRARESI, Massimiliano, RIZZO, Leonzio, ZANARDI, Alberto. Policy outcomes of single and double-ballot elections. _IEB Working Paper 2014/38_. [consulta: 25 de febrer de 2026]. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/115584]

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