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Article

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Accepted version

Publication date

2020-01

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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/149144

Do government formation deadlocks really damage economic growth? evidence from history's longest period of government formation impasse

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https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12410

Abstract

Several countries have experienced lengthy periods of political deadlock in recent years, as they have sought to form a new government. This study examines whether government formation deadlocks damage a country's economy. To do so, we analyze the case of Belgium, which took a record 541 days to create a post-election government, following the June 2010 federal elections. Employing the synthetic control method, our results show that the Belgium's economy did not suffer an economic toll; on the contrary, Gross Domestic Product per capita growth was higher than would have otherwise been expected. As such, our evidence contradicts frequent claims that long periods of government formation deadlock negatively affect an economy

Subject

Govern parlamentari, Teoria econòmica, Política

Subject (English)

Cabinet system, Economic theory, Practical politics

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Articles publicats en revistes (Econometria, Estadística i Economia Aplicada)

Citation

ALBALATE, Daniel and BEL I QUERALT, Germà. Do government formation deadlocks really damage economic growth? evidence from history's longest period of government formation impasse. Governance. An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions. 2020. Vol. 33, num. 1, pags. 155-171. ISSN 0952-1895. [consulted: 19 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/149144

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