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2018-07

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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/125408

Empirical Evidence on Imperfect Information in the Parking Market

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Abstract

The main focus of the literature on the economics of parking has been on the cruising-for-parking externality and garage market power. However, all studies to date assume the existence of perfect information. Yet, imperfect information may well arise as drivers: (1) may not be aware of all the options available in their choice set; and (2) lack the information required to evaluate them, thus exacerbating the aforementioned distortions. We provide compelling evidence for the existence of information frictions in this market by examining the case of Barcelona, and we test whether users' lack of knowledge translates into undesirable market outcomes.

Subject

Aparcaments, Garatges, Control de preus, Planificació del transport

Subject (English)

Parking garages, Garages, Price control, Transportation planning

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Articles publicats en revistes (Econometria, Estadística i Economia Aplicada)

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ALBALATE, Daniel and GRAGERA LLADÓ, Albert. Empirical Evidence on Imperfect Information in the Parking Market. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy. 2018. Vol. 52, num. 3, pags. 322-342. ISSN 0022-5258. [consulted: 16 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/125408

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