From Rivals to Allies? CEO Connections in an Era of Common Ownership

dc.contributor.authorHutschenreiter, Dennis C.
dc.contributor.authorQianshuo, Liu
dc.date.accessioned2025-06-13T09:54:21Z
dc.date.available2025-06-13T09:54:21Z
dc.date.issued2025
dc.description.abstractInstitutional common ownership of firm pairs in the same industry increases the likelihood of a preexisting social connection among their CEOs. We establish this relationship using a quasinatural experiment that exploits institutional mergers combined with firms' hiring events and detailed information on CEO biographies. In addition, for peer firms, gaining a CEO connection from a hiring firm's CEO appointment correlates with higher returns on assets, stock market returns, and decreasing product similarity between companies. We find evidence consistent with common owners allocating CEO connections to shape managerial decisionmaking and increase portfolio firms' performance.ca
dc.format.extent68 p.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/221525
dc.language.isoengca
dc.relation.ispartofUB Economics – Working Papers, 2025, E25/486
dc.relation.ispartofseries[WP E-Eco25/486]ca
dc.rightscc-by-nc-nd, (c) Hutschenreiter, et al., 2025
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/*
dc.sourceUB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]
dc.subject.classificationGestió de cartera
dc.subject.classificationInversions
dc.subject.classificationCooperació empresarial
dc.subject.otherPortfolio management
dc.subject.otherInvestments
dc.subject.otherEnterprise cooperation
dc.titleFrom Rivals to Allies? CEO Connections in an Era of Common Ownershipca
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperca

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