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cc by-nc-nd (c) Moshammer, 2025
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/217404

A Sociocultural Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value

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Realist theories of value assert that evaluative truths exist independently of human minds. At the same time, the content and formation of evaluative judgements are affected by sociocultural forces. This thesis critically analyzes the compatibility of realist theories of value with the influence of sociocultural forces on evaluative judgments. Realists must explain how this culturally shaped evaluative content relates to the mind-independent evaluative truths they posit. I argue that moral realists encounter a dilemma in reconciling the existence of mind-independent evaluative truths with the influence of sociocultural forces on evaluative judgements. The dilemma presented in this thesis consists of two problematic pathways for realism. The first option claims no relation between sociocultural influences and independent evaluative truths. This leads to our evaluative judgments likely being distorted, and a skeptical view about the ability to access true moral knowledge. On the other hand, realists can posit that sociocultural evaluative judgments are aligned with independent truths. In that case, they must account for how these judgments, which are shaped by diverse and often conflicting cultural influences, reliably track objective moral facts. I conclude that they are not able to do so, leaving the realist with no satisfactory account explaining the relation between socioculturally shaped evaluative attitudes and mind-independent evaluative truth.

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Màster en Filosofia Analítica (APhil), Facultat Filosofía, Universitat de Barcelona, Curs: 2023-2024, Director/Tutor: Ryan P. Doran

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ROBERTO PAUL, Moshammer. A Sociocultural Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value. [consulta: 7 de gener de 2026]. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/217404]

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