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IEB15-01_Foremny.pdf (1.57 MB)

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Document de treball

Data de publicació

2015

Llicència de publicació

cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Foremny et al., 2015
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/115343

Overlapping political budget cycles in the legislative and the executive

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Resum

We advance the literature on political budget cycles by testing separately for cycles in expenditures for elections in the legislative and the executive. Using municipal data, we can separately identify these cycles and account for general year effects. For the executive branch, we show that it is important whether the incumbent re-runs. To account for the potential endogeneity associated with this decision, we apply a unique instrumental variables approach based on age and pension eligibility rules. We find sizable and significant effects in expenditures before council elections and before joint elections when the incumbent re-runs.

Matèries

Eleccions, Despesa pública, Eleccions locals

Matèries (anglès)

Elections, Public expenditures, Local elections

Citació

Col·leccions

IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers

Citació

FOREMNY, Dirk, FREIER, Ronny, MOESSINGER, Marc-daniel, YETER, Mustafa. Overlapping political budget cycles in the legislative and the executive. _IEB Working Paper 2015/01_. [consulta: 21 de gener de 2026]. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/115343]

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