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2017-05-01

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cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2017
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199460

An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game

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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2017.03.001

Abstract

Solymosi and Raghavan (2001), characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. While their proof makes use of graph-theoretical tools, the alternative proof presented here relies on the notion of the buyer-seller exact representative, as introduced by Núñez and Rafels in 2002.

Subject

Teoria de jocs, Assignació de recursos, Àlgebres de Von Neumann, Problema de Neumann

Subject (English)

Game theory, Resource allocation, Von Neumann algebras, Neumann problem

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Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

Citation

ATAY, Ata. An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game. Operations Research Letters. 2017. Vol. 45, num. 3, pags. 217-219. ISSN 0167-6377. [consulted: 10 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199460

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