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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/121878
La Perspectiva del Subjecte, de Descartes a Wittgenstein
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[spa] En els anys setanta del passat segle, i inspirats pel treball de Castañeda, Perry i Lewis van sostenir que els pensaments en primera persona («de se», aquells que expressaríem de manera natural mitjançant la primera persona) presenten característiques especials que reclamen un tractament distintiu, i van proposar explicacions rivals. La noció de pensament de se està relacionada amb una distinció traçada per Wittgenstein entre usos de «jo» com a subjecte i usos de «jo» com a objecte, i amb el fenomen relacionat introduït per Shoemaker, la immunitat a l'error per identificació incorrecta. En aquest treball presento aquesta discussió contemporània, i mostro com pot il·luminar debats filosòfics tradicionals, que involucren en particular a Descartes i a Hume, al voltant de la natura del jo: mentre que Descartes va sostenir sobre la base de consideracions epistèmiques que ha de ser immaterial, Hume va argüir sobre bases similars que és introbable.
[eng] In the late 1970’s, inspired by work by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that first-personal «de se» thoughts (those we would naturally express by using the first-person) have special features that call for a distinctive account, and suggested rival explanations. The notion of «de se» thoughts is related to a distinction that Wittgenstein made between uses of «I» as object and uses of «I» as subject and a related phenomenon that Shoemaker introduced, immunity to error through misidentification. In this paper, I introduce this contemporary discussion, and show how it can illuminate traditional philosophical debates involving in particular Descartes and Hume on the nature of the self: while Descartes argued on the basis of epistemic considerations that it must be immaterial, Hume argued on related bases that it is not to be found.
[eng] In the late 1970’s, inspired by work by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that first-personal «de se» thoughts (those we would naturally express by using the first-person) have special features that call for a distinctive account, and suggested rival explanations. The notion of «de se» thoughts is related to a distinction that Wittgenstein made between uses of «I» as object and uses of «I» as subject and a related phenomenon that Shoemaker introduced, immunity to error through misidentification. In this paper, I introduce this contemporary discussion, and show how it can illuminate traditional philosophical debates involving in particular Descartes and Hume on the nature of the self: while Descartes argued on the basis of epistemic considerations that it must be immaterial, Hume argued on related bases that it is not to be found.
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GARCÍA-CARPINTERO, Manuel. La Perspectiva del Subjecte, de Descartes a Wittgenstein. Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia. 2014. Vol. XXV, num. 203-215. ISSN 1130-4383. [consulted: 11 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/121878