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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/191421
How Changing Party Systems Shape the Functioning of Democracy
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[eng] Party systems have become increasingly complex in the last decades. Although they are one of the cornerstones of liberal democracies, there is still little agreement in the literature as to whether different configurations of party systems constitute good or bad news for democracy. In the three empirical papers of this dissertation, I explore the relationship between party system fragmentation and polarization and two outcomes crucial for the functioning of democracy: accountability and incumbent turnover.
First, I analyze the effect of government fragmentation on accountability with respect to corruption scandals. Most previous studies on the topic have assumed that voters punish all kinds of governments for all types of corruption. I challenge this assumption by distinguishing between two types of governments (single-party majority governments and minority/coalition governments) and two types of corruption (welfare-increasing and welfare-decreasing corruption). I argue that voters are better able to identify bad governments when one party holds the majority of seats. Using data from Spanish municipalities, I show that corruption has a negative effect on the electoral performance of single-party majority governments, but this is not the case in minority/coalition governments, in which the mayor relies on the support of other parties.
The second article focuses on the fragmentation of the opposition and analyzes how it shapes the vote for incumbents who have been charged with corruption. Opposition parties play a key role in holding governments accountable, as voters need to find an attractive alternative in order to vote against the incumbent. I argue that ideological proximity and the opposition parties’ viability are the two main parameters that explain how opposition fragmentation conditions accountability. I also argue that voters are not homogeneous when it comes to evaluating the alternatives: some give more weight to ideology, others to viability. I test these hypotheses using data from a survey experiment. The results indicate that opposition fragmentation clearly facilitates accountability. This is specially the case for more ideologue voters, who only punish incumbents when they can find an ideologically close alternative.
Finally, the third article delves into the effects of polarization on support for the incumbent and incumbent turnover. This study contends that polarization can decrease turnover by favoring voters’ coordination around incumbent candidates. The hypotheses are tested using a Regression Dis- continuity Design on data from legislative and cantonal elections in France. The results show that polarization clearly increases the vote for incumbent candidates and, consequently, decreases alternation. These effects are particularly strong when polarization is associated with the presence of extreme runner-up candidates in the election: when that is the case, almost every single incumbent is able to secure reelection.
Overall, this dissertation improves our understanding of how different properties of party systems shape how democracy works and clarifies when and why each of these properties matters for each outcome. By applying a variety of methods (observational, experimental, and quasi-experimental), I show that, in terms of accountability, single-party governments facing fragmented oppositions are best for democracy. Polarization, in turn, feeds electoral support for incumbent candidates and prevents them from losing office.
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FERRER JUAN, Sergi. How Changing Party Systems Shape the Functioning of Democracy. [consulta: 14 de desembre de 2025]. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/191421]