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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116854
Interregional transfers, group loyalty and the decentralization of redistribution
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We study the decentralization of redistributive taxation in a political economy model assuming regional heterogeneity regarding both group identity and average income. If a centralized system permits a beneficial pooling of national resources, it might also decrease the degree of solidarity in the society. With no group loyalty, centralization Pareto-dominates decentralization even when regions are not identical. Furthermore, increased heterogeneity need not increase the relative efficiency of decentralization. If regions are equally rich, centralization Pareto-dominates decentralization whenever group loyalty is not perfect. Finally, centralization is always more efficient than decentralization even when allowing for interregional transfers.
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FLAMAND, Sabine. Interregional transfers, group loyalty and the decentralization of redistribution. _IEB Working Paper 2010/37_. [consulta: 24 de gener de 2026]. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116854]