Files

IR18-023_Albalate+Bel+Gragera.pdf (1.07 MB)

Document type

Working paper

Publication date

2018

Publication license

cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Albalate et al., 2018
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/125158

When politics and lobbyism combine to promote white elephants by using PPPs

Journal Title

Authors

Director/Tutor

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Related resource

Abstract

Theoretical insights into the cooperation between public and private partners (PPPs) suggest that they can be an effective tool for preventing ‘white elephant’ type projects. However, various case studies have shown that this belief is largely dependent on the effective transfer of operational risk to the private partner, and on the application of user-pay funding. This paper goes one step further and explores the idea that private partners that participate in PPPs with no substantial risk transfer – and under heavily subsidized schemes – can act as lobbies, exerting pressure to develop white elephants.

Subject

Infraestructures (Transport), Tramvies, Anàlisi d'impacte (Política governamental)

Subject (English)

Transportation buildings, Street-railroads, Impact analysis (Public administration)

Citation

Collections

Documents de treball (Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública (IREA))

Citation

ALBALATE, Daniel, BEL I QUERALT, Germà and GRAGERA LLADÓ, Albert. When politics and lobbyism combine to promote white elephants by using PPPs. IREA – Working Papers. 2018. Vol.  IR18/23. [consulted: 15 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/125158

Export metadata

JSON - METS

Share record