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2025-08-03

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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/229774

Fiscal Rules and the Selection of Politicians: Theory and Evidence from Italy

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Recurs relacionat

https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20220325

Resum

Fiscal rules, or constraints on the policymaking discretion of elected o cials, are widely used to regulate scal policies. Using data on Italian municipalities, we employ a di erence-in-discontinuity design to provide evidence of the negative e ect of scal rules on mayoral candidates education. Municipalities in which scal rules meaningfully restrict the action space of politicians drive the e ect. These results are consistent with a formal model of scal rules and political selection. We highlight that reducing discretion may a ect the composition of the pool of players: it may alleviate pork-barrel spending but also negatively a ect the education of politicians.

Matèries

Dret fiscal, Polítics, Selecció de personal

Matèries (anglès)

Tax law, Politicians, Employee selection

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Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)

Citació

GAMALERIO, Matteo and TROMBETTA, Federico. Fiscal Rules and the Selection of Politicians: Theory and Evidence from Italy. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. 2025. Vol. 17, num. 3, pags. 131-164. ISSN 1945-7731. [consulted: 30 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/229774

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