Document type
ArticleVersion
Accepted versionPublication date
All rights reserved
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/147065
Defending Nonreductionism About Understanding
Journal Title
Authors
Director/Tutor
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Related resource
Abstract
In this note I defend nonreductionism about understanding by arguing that knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding. To this end, I examine Paulina Sliwa's (2015, 2017) novel defence of knowledge‐based Reductionism (Reductionism for short). Sliwa claims that one understands why p if and only if one has a sufficient amount of knowledge why p. Sliwa contends that Reductionism is supported by intuitive verdicts about our uses of 'understanding why' and 'knowing why'. In reply, I first argue that Sliwa's Reductionism leads to a vicious infinite regress. Secondly, I defuse the motivation in favour of Reductionism by showing how the linguistic data can be accommodated within a Nonreductionist framework.
Subject (English)
Citation
Citation
PALMIRA, Michele. Defending Nonreductionism About Understanding. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. 2019. Vol. 8, num. 3, pags. 222-231. ISSN 2161-2234. [consulted: 8 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/147065