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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/229443
Segment and rule: Modern censorship in authoritarian regimes
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We analyze the incentives of authoritarian regimes to segment access to censored content through technology. Citizens choose whether to pay to access censored online content at a cost fixed by the regime: the firewall. A low firewall segments access and generates more compliance than full censorship – a high firewall – ever could. Regime opponents self-select into consuming censored content, and comply conditional on positive independent reporting. Regime supporters exclusively consume state propaganda, which secures their compliance. This segment-and-rule strategy can be engineered by making local news outlets uninformative, or by affecting the intrinsic benefit from access.
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KUN, Heo and ZERBINI, Antoine. Segment and rule: Modern censorship in authoritarian regimes. IEB Working Paper 2026/06. [consulted: 22 of May of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/229443