The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games

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dc.contributor.authorIzquierdo Aznar, Josep Maria
dc.contributor.authorRafels, Carles
dc.date.accessioned2018-02-26T10:52:08Z
dc.date.available2019-12-31T06:10:12Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.date.updated2018-02-26T10:52:08Z
dc.description.abstractWithin the class of superadditive cooperative games with transferable utility, the convexity of a game is characterized by the coincidence of its core and the steady bargaining set. As a consequence it is also proved that convexity can also be characterized by the coincidence of the core of a game and the modi ed Zhou bargaining set (Shimomura, 1997)
dc.format.extent20 p.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.idgrec675399
dc.identifier.issn0020-7276
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/120240
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherSpringer Verlag
dc.relation.isformatofVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0576-8
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Journal of Game Theory, 2018, vol. 47, num. 1, p. 35-54
dc.relation.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0576-8
dc.rights(c) Springer Verlag, 2018
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.sourceArticles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)
dc.subject.classificationTeoria de jocs
dc.subject.classificationAssignació de recursos
dc.subject.classificationFuncions convexes
dc.subject.otherGame theory
dc.subject.otherResource allocation
dc.subject.otherConvex functions
dc.titleThe core and the steady bargaining set for convex games
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion

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