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2018

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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/120240

The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games

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https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0576-8

Abstract

Within the class of superadditive cooperative games with transferable utility, the convexity of a game is characterized by the coincidence of its core and the steady bargaining set. As a consequence it is also proved that convexity can also be characterized by the coincidence of the core of a game and the modi ed Zhou bargaining set (Shimomura, 1997)

Subject

Teoria de jocs, Assignació de recursos, Funcions convexes

Subject (English)

Game theory, Resource allocation, Convex functions

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Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

Citation

IZQUIERDO AZNAR, Josep Maria and RAFELS, Carles. The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games. International Journal of Game Theory. 2018. Vol. 47, num. 1, pags. 35-54. ISSN 0020-7276. [consulted: 6 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/120240

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