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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/58886
Does Rigidity of Prices Hide Collusion?
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Cartel detection is one of the most basic and most complicated tasks of competition authorities. In recent years, however, variance filters have provided a fairly simple tool for rejecting the existence of price-fixing, with the added advantage that the methodology requires only a low volume of data. In this paper we analyze two aspects of variance filters: 1- the relationship established between market structure and price rigidity, and 2- the use of different benchmarks for implementing the filters. This paper addresses these two issues by applying a variance filter to a gasoline retail market characterized by a set of unique features. Our results confirm the positive relationship between monopolies and price rigidity, and the variance filter's ability to detect non-competitive behavior when an appropriate benchmark is used. Our findings should serve to promote the implementation of this methodology among competition authorities, albeit in the awareness that a more exhaustive complementary analysis is required.
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JIMÉNEZ GONZÁLEZ, Juan luis, PERDIGUERO, Jordi. Does Rigidity of Prices Hide Collusion?. _IREA – Working Papers_. 2011. Vol. IR11/20. [consulta: 22 de gener de 2026]. ISSN: 2014-1254. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/58886]