Optimal discounts in green public procurement

dc.contributor.authorChiappinelli, Olga
dc.contributor.authorSeres, Gyula
dc.date.accessioned2025-02-11T17:29:16Z
dc.date.available2025-02-11T17:29:16Z
dc.date.issued2024-05-01
dc.date.updated2025-02-11T17:29:16Z
dc.description.abstractWe provide an auction-theoretical analysis of Green Public Procurement (GPP) as a preferential program aimed at stimulating investment in green technologies. We find that GPP incentivizes more competitive firms to invest. We also show that GPP can be an optimal mechanism for a procurer who cares about minimizing the purchasing price while triggering green investment.
dc.format.extent4 p.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.idgrec748885
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/218675
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherElsevier B.V.
dc.relation.isformatofReproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111705
dc.relation.ispartofEconomics Letters, 2024, vol. 238, num.May, p. 1-4
dc.relation.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111705
dc.rightscc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2024
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/*
dc.sourceArticles publicats en revistes (Economia)
dc.subject.classificationPolítica ambiental
dc.subject.classificationContractes administratius
dc.subject.classificationSubhastes
dc.subject.classificationPolítica de despesa pública
dc.subject.otherEnvironmental policy
dc.subject.otherPublic contracts
dc.subject.otherAuctions
dc.subject.otherGovernment spending policy
dc.titleOptimal discounts in green public procurement
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion

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