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The philosophical significance of the De Se
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Inspired by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that, among singular thoughts in general, thoughts about oneself 'as oneself' - first-personal thoughts, which Lewis aptly called de se - call for special treatment: we need to abandon one of two traditional assumptions on the contents needed to provide rationalizing explanations, their shareability or their absoluteness. Their arguments have been very influential; one might take them as establishing a new 'effect' - new philosophical evidence in need of being accounted for. This is questioned by the skeptical arguments in recent work by Cappelen & Dever and Magidor, along lines that a few discrepant voices had already announced earlier. Skeptics content that the evidence does not really call for revising traditional theories of content. I will discuss their challenges - first and foremost, concerning action explanations - aiming to make the case that the 'De Se effect' is no illusion: de se attitudes require us to revise one of the two tenets of traditional views.
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GARCÍA-CARPINTERO, Manuel. The philosophical significance of the De Se. _Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy_. 2017. Vol. 60, núm. 3. [consulta: 24 de gener de 2026]. ISSN: 0020-174X. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/106300]