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An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets
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On the domain of two-sided assignment markets with agents' reservation values, the nucleolus is axiomatized as the unique solution that satisfies consistency with respect to Owen's reduced game and symmetry of maximum complaints of the two sides. As an adjunt, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus by means of a strong form of the bisection property that characterizes the intersection between the core and the kernel of a coalitional game in Maschler et al. (1979)
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LLERENA GARRÉS, Francesc, NÚÑEZ, Marina (Núñez Oliva) and RAFELS, Carles. An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets. International Journal of Game Theory. 2015. Vol. 44, num. 1, pags. 1-15. ISSN 0020-7276. [consulted: 6 of October of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/106690