An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets

dc.contributor.authorLlerena Garrés, Francesc
dc.contributor.authorNúñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)
dc.contributor.authorRafels, Carles
dc.date.accessioned2017-02-09T08:40:08Z
dc.date.available2017-02-09T08:40:08Z
dc.date.issued2015-02
dc.date.updated2017-02-09T08:40:08Z
dc.description.abstractOn the domain of two-sided assignment markets with agents' reservation values, the nucleolus is axiomatized as the unique solution that satisfies consistency with respect to Owen's reduced game and symmetry of maximum complaints of the two sides. As an adjunt, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus by means of a strong form of the bisection property that characterizes the intersection between the core and the kernel of a coalitional game in Maschler et al. (1979)
dc.format.extent15 p.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.idgrec635163
dc.identifier.issn0020-7276
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/106690
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherSpringer Verlag
dc.relation.isformatofVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0416-z
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Journal of Game Theory, 2015, vol. 44, num. 1, p. 1-15
dc.relation.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0416-z
dc.rights(c) Springer Verlag, 2015
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.sourceArticles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)
dc.subject.classificationTeoria de jocs
dc.subject.classificationTeoria de conjunts
dc.subject.classificationLògica matemàtica
dc.subject.classificationPresa de decisions
dc.subject.otherGame theory
dc.subject.otherSet theory
dc.subject.otherMathematical logic
dc.subject.otherDecision making
dc.titleAn axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion

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