Amb motiu del tancament d'estiu, la validació de documents es reprendrà a partir del 28 d'agost de 2026. Disculpeu les molèsties.
Con motivo del cierre de verano, la validación de documentos se reanudará a partir del 28 de agosto de 2026. Disculpad las molestias
Due to the summer closure, document validation will resume starting August 28, 2026. We apologize for any inconvenience.

Files

tfg_salat_tramuns_bernat.pdf (508.9 KB)

Document type

Bachelor thesis

Publication date

2024-06-10

Publication license

cc-by-nc-nd (c) Bernat Salat Tramuns, 2024
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/220710

Costly Voting Models

Journal Title

Authors

Director/Tutor

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Related resource

Abstract

We review different game-theoretical models of elections where voters incur voting costs. In those models, we focus on the equilibrium equations and see how these change with different assumptions on the fundamentals of the model. We provide additional proofs and further detail some existing ones as well as analyze some interesting concepts such as self-defeating polls, handicaps and false-consensus. All of the models focus on the concept of pivotal voter. By looking into these models, we aim to deepen understanding of voting dynamics and their implications.

Description

Treballs Finals de Grau de Matemàtiques, Facultat de Matemàtiques, Universitat de Barcelona, Any: 2024, Director: Oriol Tejada i Xavier Jarque i Ribera

Subject

Teoria de jocs, Vot, Eleccions, Treballs de fi de grau

Subject (English)

Game theory, Voting, Elections, Bachelor's theses

Citation

Collections

Treballs Finals de Grau (TFG) - Matemàtiques

Citation

SALAT TRAMUNS, Bernat. Costly Voting Models. [consulted: 8 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/220710

Export metadata

JSON - METS

Share record