Document type

Article

Version

Published version

Publication date

All rights reserved

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/99044

Razonamiento bayesiano: una revisión teórica

Journal Title

Director/Tutor

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Related resource

Abstract

This article analyzes the leading theoretical approaches to Bayesian reasoning in the literature, and its main sources of empirical support. Many errors in probability estimates are attributed to people's inability to think in statistical tems when faced with information about a single event. Specifically, in situations where the normative model is Bayes's theorem, the well-known base rate neglect is analyzed both from rhe heuristic and biases approach, of Tversky and Kahneman, and from the frequentist hypothesis defended by Gigerenzer, Cosmides et al. The discrepancy between intuitions and formal mathenlatical reasoning is also analyzed through the studies with the three prisoners problem. Finally, we present the mental rnodel theoly of extensional probabilistic reasoning (Johnsorl-Laid et al., 1999) which explains how naive individuals can infer posterior probabilities without relying on Bayes 's theorern.

Citation

Citation

ALONSO CÁNOVAS, Diego and TUBAU SALA, Elisabet. Razonamiento bayesiano: una revisión teórica. Anuario de Psicología. 2002. Vol. 33, num. 1, pags. 25-48. ISSN 0066-5126. [consulted: 17 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/99044

Export metadata

JSON - METS

Share record