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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/115355
Optimality and distortionary lobbying: regulating tobacco consumption
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Abstract
We examine policies directed at regulating tobacco consumption through three types of instruments: (i) an excise tax hindering consumption by increasing the price of cigarettes, (ii) prevention programs helping consumers to make choices that are more time consistent when trading-off the current pleasure from smoking and its future health harms, and (iii) smoking bans directly restricting consumption. First, on normative grounds, we focus on the optimal design of public policies maximizing the economy’s surplus. Second, in a positive perspective, we investigate how the lobbying activities of the tobacco industry, of smokers, and of anti-tobacco organizations may distort government intervention.
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COLOMBO, Luca and GALMARINI, Umberto. Optimality and distortionary lobbying: regulating tobacco consumption. IEB Working Paper 2015/02. [consulted: 7 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/115355