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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/217646
Imagining a Way Out of Dream Skepticism
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The problem of dream skepticism – i.e., the problem of what can justify one’s belief
that they are not dreaming – is one of the most famous problems in philosophy. I
propose a way of responding to the problem which is available if one subscribes to
the theory that the sensory experiences that we have in dreams consist of images
(as opposed to false percepts). The response exploits a particular feature of imagination, viz., that it is not possible to simultaneously have two separate imagistic experiences in the same modality.
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GREGORY, Daniel. Imagining a Way Out of Dream Skepticism. Erkenntnis. An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy. 2023. Vol. 89, num. 2967-2984. ISSN 0165-0106. [consulted: 8 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/217646