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IEB09-29_Porcelli.pdf (623.02 KB)

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Document de treball

Data de publicació

2009

Llicència de publicació

cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Porcelli, 2009
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116988

Effects of fiscal decentralisation and electoral accountability on government efficiency evidence from the Italian health care sector

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Resum

Data envelopment analysis and panel data stochastic frontier models are used to evaluate the impact of the 1995 renewal of regional political institutions and the 1998 tax reform (introduction of IRAP) on the efficiency of Italian regional governments. Both methodologies are applied to a longitudinal dataset, including financial and health care data disaggregated at the regional level from 1991 to 2005. Then, efficiency scores for the regional governments are used to examine the evolution of technical efficiency in the Italian health care sector. The final results provide new empirical evidence in support of the findings of recent theoretical models concernint the way in which fiscal decentralization and electoral accountability affect the efficiency of governmental activity.

Matèries

Administració fiscal, Descentralització administrativa, Administració sanitària, Anàlisi de dades de panel

Matèries (anglès)

Tax administration and procedure, Decentralization in government, Health services administration, Panel analysis

Citació

Col·leccions

IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers

Citació

PORCELLI, Francesco. Effects of fiscal decentralisation and electoral accountability on government efficiency evidence from the Italian health care sector. _IEB Working Paper 2009/29_. [consulta: 20 de gener de 2026]. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116988]

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