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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/107313
Empirical Evidence on Cooperation Between Sub-Central Tax Administrations
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The literature on horizontal tax interdependence pays limited attention to interactions in administrative policies, although they can play a large role in determining the amount of tax revenues collected. We investigate the incentives for sub-central tax authority cooperation in a decentralised context, with the aim of identifying the determinants of that cooperation. Our results are congruent with standard theory; in particular, the existence of reciprocity is essential for sharing tax information, but there is sluggishness in this process, which is partly the result of the short-sighted behaviour of tax authorities influenced by budget constraints. Hence, this is good news for the functioning of a decentralised tax administration as, in the medium to long run, the gains to be made from sharing tax information are achieved.
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DURÁN CABRÉ, José María, ESTELLER MORÉ, Alejandro and SALVADORI, Luca. Empirical Evidence on Cooperation Between Sub-Central Tax Administrations. Journal of Tax Administration. 2016. Vol. 2, num. 2, pags. 24-46. ISSN 2059-190X. [consulted: 7 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/107313