Explication from an Externalist Point of View

Abstract

[eng] The dissertation investigates the method of explication from an externalist point of view. Chapter1 explains externalism in the philosophy of mind and language. Externalism holds that the meaning of many of our kind terms, the concepts those terms express, is determined by factors that are external to a particular speaker or thinker. Chapter 1 shows how externalism can handle various examples of meaning change and, by that, counters the most important challenge to the view. Chapter 2 introduces the method of explication and illuminates it from two different perspectives. Explication is the method of replacing a somewhat vague concept by a more precise one. The replacement takes place in order to resolve paradox and dissolve disagreement in philosophy, to prove important theorems in mathematics, and to state general laws in the natural sciences. From a Carnapian perspective there is a high degree of semantic indeterminacy due to simple internalism. Explication is the most apt philosophical method in light of this indeterminacy. From an alternative perspective there is a high degree of ignorance and error which is explained by externalism. Since the meaning of our terms is much less indeterminate than the Carnapian perspective assumes, explication has a more limited, but still important role to play. Chapter 3 investigates Frege’s attempted execution of logicism. It is argued that Frege explicated a concept of function in order to give a conceptual analysis of our ordinary arithmetical concepts. It shows how explication can play a fruitful role even assuming externalism and assuming that there is no semantic indeterminacy. The overall conclusion of the dissertation is that, in light of the discussion, a methodological pluralism is most suitable for philosophy.