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2017

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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/147062

Pejorative discourse is not fictional

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Abstract

Hom and May (2015) argue that pejoratives mean negative prescriptive properties that externally depend on social ideologies, and that this entails a form of fictionalism: pejoratives have null extensions. There are relevant uses of fictional terms that are necessary to describe the content of fictions, and to make true statements about the world, that do not convey that speakers are committed to the fiction. This paper shows that the same constructions with pejoratives typically convey that the speaker is committed to racist ideologies, in contrast with fictional discourse that typically does not. The disanalogy undermines the plausibility of fictionalism about pejoratives. Moreover, the exceptions¿uncommitted uses in embedded constructions¿display features that conflict with Hom and May's explanation of committed uses as conversational implicatures.

Related resource

https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.258

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Filosofia del llenguatge, Anàlisi del discurs, Semàntica (Filosofia), Teoria de les ficcions, Paraules gruixudes

Subject (English)

Philosophy of language, Discourse analysis, Semantics (Philosophy), Theory of fictions, Obscene words

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Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)

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MARQUES, Teresa. Pejorative discourse is not fictional. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. 2017. Vol. 6, num. 4, pags. 250-260. ISSN 2161-2234. [consulted: 10 of October of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/147062

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