Fitxers
Embargament
Document embargat fins el 2028-06-30Tipus de document
ArticleVersió
Versió acceptadaData de publicació
Llicència de publicació
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/231094
Deposit insurance in a sequential-service constrained environment
Títol de la revista
Director/Tutor
ISSN de la revista
Títol del volum
Recurs relacionat
Resum
We study the effect of a deposit insurance scheme (DIS) in an economy with multiple isolated banks. Participant banks fund the scheme, which follows a pre-determined insurance payment scheme. An external player transfers insurance benefits to all banks where depositors are running. The total insurance payment depends on resources collected by the external authority and the number of eligible queues to receive the insurance benefit. We discuss the effect of DIS on the optimal payment contract. More specifically, we analyze the existence of bank-run equilibria and whether the optimal payment contract is incentive-compatible. We find that DIS prevents bank-run equilibria at the same time that it may expose the environment to contagion. We also see that the insurance policy relaxes the truth-telling condition for general parameters.
Matèries
Matèries (anglès)
Citació
Col·leccions
Citació
BARROS, Fernando, et al. Deposit insurance in a sequential-service constrained environment. Mathematical Social Sciences. 2025. Vol. 136. ISSN 0165-4896. [consulted: 25 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/231094