An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game [WP]

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dc.contributor.authorAtay, Ata
dc.date.accessioned2016-09-22T06:56:32Z
dc.date.available2016-09-22T06:56:32Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.date.updated2016-09-22T06:56:37Z
dc.description.abstractSolymosi and Raghavan (2001) characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. Their proof makes use of some graphtheoretical tools, while the present proof relies on the notion of buyer-seller exact representative in Núñez and Rafels (2002)
dc.format.extent9 p.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.issn1136-8365
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/102040
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherUniversitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
dc.relation.ispartofUB Economics – Working Papers, 2016, E16/350
dc.relation.ispartofseries[WP E-Eco16/350]
dc.rightscc-by-nc-nd, (c) Atay , 2016
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
dc.sourceUB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]
dc.subject.classificationTeoria de jocs
dc.subject.classificationAssignació de recursos
dc.subject.classificationÀlgebres de Von Neumann
dc.subject.classificationProblema de Neumann
dc.subject.otherGame theory
dc.subject.otherResource allocation
dc.subject.otherVon Neumann algebras
dc.subject.otherNeumann problema
dc.titleAn alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game [WP]
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper

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