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E16-350_Atay_Alternative.pdf (402.77 KB)

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Working paper

Publication date

2016

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cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Atay , 2016
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/102040

An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game [WP]

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Abstract

Solymosi and Raghavan (2001) characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. Their proof makes use of some graphtheoretical tools, while the present proof relies on the notion of buyer-seller exact representative in Núñez and Rafels (2002)

Subject

Teoria de jocs, Assignació de recursos, Àlgebres de Von Neumann, Problema de Neumann

Subject (English)

Game theory, Resource allocation, Von Neumann algebras, Neumann problema

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UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]
Documents de treball (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

Citation

ATAY, Ata. An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game [WP]. UB Economics – Working Papers. 2016. Vol.  E16/350. ISSN 1136-8365. [consulted: 14 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/102040

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