Modelos de competencia en localización

Abstract

[en] Harold Hotelling in 1929 poses the problem of locating two companies that compete over prices in a segment where consumers are evenly distributed. This model, expressed in modern terms, represents a two-stage non-cooperative game in a duopoly. The rationale for this model was to symbolize product differentiation by representing the game in a linear market. In this paper we study the original Hotelling Stability of Competition model as well as the subsequent revision made by Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) for the inconsistency of the transport cost function. We also analyze a modification of the model, the “pure”Hotelling game, where companies do not compete over prices, because prices are the same for both, but exclusively on locations. The extension to an arbitrary number of companies is natural and the results well known. We study the differences that occur in equilibrium by distinguishing between the uniform and non-uniform distribution of the population. In the latter case, significant differences appear with the previous results.