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2014-06

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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/119349

Sub-national deficits in European countries: The impact of fiscal rules and tax autonomy

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Recurs relacionat

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.01.003

Resum

This paper empirically examines how fiscal rules and tax autonomy influence deficits of sub-national sectors across European countries. I use a new panel-data set to measure tax autonomy and the stringency of fiscal rules for EU15 regional and local government sectors over the period 1995 to 2008. I apply an instrumental variables approach to obtain an unbiased estimate of the impact of fiscal rules on deficits. I use political variables describing the central governments characteristics as instruments for fiscal rules at the sub-national level. The results show that the effectiveness of fiscal rules and tax autonomy depends on the constitutional structure. Fiscal rules decrease deficits only in unitary countries. Deficits of sub-national sectors in federations can be avoided through tax autonomy.

Matèries

Política fiscal, Dèficit públic, Deute tributari, Països de la Unió Europea

Matèries (anglès)

Fiscal policy, Budget deficits, Tax debt, European Union countries

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Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)

Citació

FOREMNY, Dirk. Sub-national deficits in European countries: The impact of fiscal rules and tax autonomy. European Journal of Political Economy. 2014. Vol. 34, num. June, pags. 86-110. ISSN 0176-2680. [consulted: 9 of July of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/119349

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