Tipus de document

Article

Versió

Versió publicada

Data de publicació

Llicència de publicació

cc by (c) Kortabarria Areitio, Markel , 2025
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/228680

Is it Possible to do Without the Fundamental?

Títol de la revista

Director/Tutor

ISSN de la revista

Títol del volum

Resum

This article argues that one of the main arguments against metaphysical infinitism—the argument from vicious infinite regress—is unsuccessful. I suggest that a proper interpretation of the argument takes the charge against infinitism to be one of metaphysical insufficiency: without the fundamental facts fully grounding the rest of reality, derivative facts lack the necessary grounding base for their obtaining. I disambiguate the insufficiency claim by examining it from two different perspectives on the regress: the local perspective, which focuses on the obtaining of the individual derivative facts, and the global perspective, which focuses on the obtaining of the entire collection of derivative facts. For each perspective, I argue that the reasons for believing that infinitism cannot provide sufficient grounds are problematic.

Citació

Citació

KORTABARRIA AREITIO, Markel. Is it Possible to do Without the Fundamental?. Philosophia. Philosophical Quarterly of Israel. 2025. ISSN 0048-3893. [consulta: 11 de maig de 2026]. Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/228680

Exportar metadades

JSON - METS

Compartir registre