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IEB13-29_Revelli.pdf (1.82 MB)

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Working paper

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2013

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cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Revelli, 2013
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/115898

Tax limits and local democracy

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Abstract

Based on a theoretical model where state limits on local government policy elicit a move from private value (position issue) to common value (valence issue) voting, I exploit exogenous variation in tax limitation rules in over 7,000 Italian municipalities during the 2000s to show that fiscal restraints provoke a fall in voter turnout and number of mayor candidates, and a rise in elected mayors’ valence proxy and win margins. The evidence is compatible with the hypothesis of hierarchical tax limitations fading the ideological stakes of local elections and favoring valence-based party line crossing, thus questioning the influential accountability postulate of the fiscal decentralization lore.

Subject

Administració fiscal, Eleccions locals, Descentralització administrativa

Subject (English)

Tax administration and procedure, Local elections, Decentralization in government

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IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers

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REVELLI, Federico. Tax limits and local democracy. IEB Working Paper 2013/29. [consulted: 18 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/115898

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