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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/115898
Tax limits and local democracy
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Based on a theoretical model where state limits on local government policy elicit a move from private value (position issue) to common value (valence issue) voting, I exploit exogenous variation in tax limitation rules in over 7,000 Italian municipalities during the 2000s to show that fiscal restraints provoke a fall in voter turnout and number of mayor candidates, and a rise in elected mayors’ valence proxy and win margins. The evidence is compatible with the hypothesis of hierarchical tax limitations fading the ideological stakes of local elections and favoring valence-based party line crossing, thus questioning the influential accountability postulate of the fiscal decentralization lore.
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REVELLI, Federico. Tax limits and local democracy. IEB Working Paper 2013/29. [consulted: 29 of September of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/115898