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2021

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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/208370

Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions

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Abstract

Several philosophers advance substantive theories of propositions, to deal with several issues they raise in connection with a concern with a long pedigree in philosophy, the problem of the unity of propositions. The qualification ‘substantive’ is meant to contrast with ‘minimal’ or ‘deflationary’ – roughly, views that reject that propositions have a hidden nature, worth investigating. Substantive views appear to create spurious problems by characterizing propositions in ways that make them unfit to perform their theoretical jobs. I will present in this light some critical points against Hanks’ (2015, 2019) act-theoretic view, and Recanati’s (2019) recent elaboration of Hanks’ notion of cancellation. Both Hanks and Recanati, I’ll argue, rely on problematic conceptions of fiction and pretense.

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https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1990795

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Representació (Filosofia), Proposició (Lògica)

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Representation (Philosophy), Proposition (Logic)

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GARCÍA-CARPINTERO, Manuel. Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions. Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. 2021. ISSN 0020-174X. [consulted: 13 of October of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/208370

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