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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116345
Partisan targeting of inter-governmental transfers & state interference in local elections: evidence from Spain [WP-IEB]
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We examine whether state-level incumbents discriminate in the allocation of transfers in favour of local governments controlled by co-partisans, and whether the electoral prospects of local incumbents improve when they are aligned with the State incumbent. Using a new database covering around 3,000 Spanish municipalities during the period 2000-07 and a Regression Discontinuity design, we document a very strong and robust effect: in close races, municipalities aligned with the regional government obtain on average 83% more per capita transfers and their incumbents gain 10% more votes at the local elections. We also show that the effect of alignment is stronger: (i) when regional and local elections are held on the same day, (ii) in regions with less competitive regional elections, and (ii) in regions with more budget resources.
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CURTO GRAU, Marta, SOLÉ OLLÉ, Albert, SORRIBAS, Pilar. Partisan targeting of inter-governmental transfers & state interference in local elections: evidence from Spain [WP-IEB]. _IEB Working Paper 2012/31_. [consulta: 27 de gener de 2026]. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116345]