Carregant...
Fitxers
Tipus de document
Treball de fi de grauData de publicació
Llicència de publicació
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/125770
Two-sided matching markets
Títol de la revista
Autors
Director/Tutor
ISSN de la revista
Títol del volum
Recurs relacionat
Resum
[en] Two-sided matching markets are the main object of study of Matching theory, a branch of Game theory that involves discrete mathematics. A two-sided matching market is a market whose agents belong to one of two distinct sets and such that its outcome is an assignment of agents from one set to the other, and vice-versa.
In this work, we first give some basic definitions of Game theory, and turn then to study two kinds of matching markets: one-to-one matching markets, in which an agent from one set ends up matched to at most one agent on the other set, and many-to-one matching markets, in which agents on one of the two sets might end up matched to several agents on the other set. The former will be studied by means of the marriage problem
in Chapter 3, and the latter by means of the college admissions problem in Chapter 4. To conclude, in Chapter 5 there is an outline of some alternative mechanisms used in different contexts to solve problems that are similar to those already studied.
Descripció
Treballs Finals de Grau de Matemàtiques, Facultat de Matemàtiques, Universitat de Barcelona, Any: 2018, Director: F. Javier Martínez de Albéniz
Matèries (anglès)
Citació
Col·leccions
Citació
FERNÁNDEZ GRANDE, Paula. Two-sided matching markets. [consulta: 30 de gener de 2026]. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/125770]