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cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Mantovani et al., 2012
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116311

The strategic interplay between bundling and merging in complementary markets

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In this paper, two pairs of complementors have to decide whether to merge and eventually bundle their products. Depending on the degree of competitive pressure in the market, either both pairs decide to merge (with or without bundling), or only one pair merges and bundles, while rivals remain independent. The latter case can very harmful for consumers as it brings surge in prices. We also consider the case in which one pair moves first. Interestingly, we find a parametric region where first movers merge but refrain from bundling, to not induce rivals to merge as well.

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MANTOVANI, Andrea and VANDEKERCKHOVE, Jan. The strategic interplay between bundling and merging in complementary markets. IEB Working Paper 2012/10. [consulted: 3 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116311

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