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IEB12-10_Mantovani.pdf (638.85 KB)

Document type

Working paper

Publication date

2012

Publication license

cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Mantovani et al., 2012
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116311

The strategic interplay between bundling and merging in complementary markets

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Abstract

In this paper, two pairs of complementors have to decide whether to merge and eventually bundle their products. Depending on the degree of competitive pressure in the market, either both pairs decide to merge (with or without bundling), or only one pair merges and bundles, while rivals remain independent. The latter case can very harmful for consumers as it brings surge in prices. We also consider the case in which one pair moves first. Interestingly, we find a parametric region where first movers merge but refrain from bundling, to not induce rivals to merge as well.

Subject

Fusió d'empreses, Mercat financer, Dret de la competència

Subject (English)

Consolidation and merger of corporations, Financial market, Antitrust law

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IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers

Citation

MANTOVANI, Andrea and VANDEKERCKHOVE, Jan. The strategic interplay between bundling and merging in complementary markets. IEB Working Paper 2012/10. [consulted: 8 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116311

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