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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/191044
Tschirnhaus y la física relacional
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[spa] Los estudiosos han visto en las dificultades de Spinoza para hacer frente a las objeciones dirigidas por Tschirnhaus contra sus planteamientos físicos la razón de que este último se desvinculase del primero en el ámbito de la filosofía natural. El objetivo de este artículo es, por un lado, refutar este diagnóstico y, por el otro, mostrar que la causa del mismo radica en haber obviado una importante corriente de pensamiento poscartesiano, sepultada en el olvido por el triunfo de la mecánica newtoniana, que pretendía desarrollar una física en términos puramente relacionales. A su vez, ello nos permitirá leer las propuestas físicas de Spinoza y Tschirnhaus como ejemplos paradigmáticos de esta física relacional.
[eng] Scholars have considered that Spinoza's difficulties in dealing with the objections raised by Tschirnhaus against his physical approaches were the spur that led the latter to dissociate himself from the former in the field of natural philosophy. The aim of this paper is, on the one hand, to refute this misjudgement and, on the other, to show that the cause of it lies in having dismissed a significant post-Cartesian current of thought, buried in oblivion by the triumph of Newtonian mechanics, which intended to develop a physics in purely relational terms. In turn, this will allow us to read the physical proposals of Spinoza and Tschirnhaus as paradigmatic examples of this relational physics.
[eng] Scholars have considered that Spinoza's difficulties in dealing with the objections raised by Tschirnhaus against his physical approaches were the spur that led the latter to dissociate himself from the former in the field of natural philosophy. The aim of this paper is, on the one hand, to refute this misjudgement and, on the other, to show that the cause of it lies in having dismissed a significant post-Cartesian current of thought, buried in oblivion by the triumph of Newtonian mechanics, which intended to develop a physics in purely relational terms. In turn, this will allow us to read the physical proposals of Spinoza and Tschirnhaus as paradigmatic examples of this relational physics.
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MONTOSA, Pablo. Tschirnhaus y la física relacional. Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía. 2022. Vol. 39, num. 1, pags. 89-103. ISSN 0211-2337. [consulted: 17 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/191044