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IEB12-33_Rizzo.pdf (1.02 MB)

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Document de treball

Data de publicació

2012

Llicència de publicació

cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Rizzo et al., 2012
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116363

Single vs double ballot and party coalitions: the impact on fiscal policy. Evidence from Italy

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Resum

We use data for all Italian municipalities, from 2001-2006, to empirically test the extent to which two electoral rules, which hold, for small and large municipalities, affect fiscal policy decisions. Municipalities with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants elect their mayors in accordance with a single ballot plurality rule while the rest of the municipalities uses a run-off plurality rule. Per capita total taxes, charges and current expenditure in large municipalities are lower than in small ones if the mayor of the large municipality does not need a broad coalition to be elected.

Matèries

Eleccions locals, Federalisme, Impostos

Matèries (anglès)

Local elections, Federalism, Taxation

Citació

Col·leccions

IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers

Citació

RIZZO, Leonzio and ZANARDI, Alberto. Single vs double ballot and party coalitions: the impact on fiscal policy. Evidence from Italy. IEB Working Paper 2012/33. [consulted: 1 of July of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116363

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